With consumers set to be squeezed after the 2010 election, supermarket shares may not prove to be as defensive as they used to be.  Stockmarket folklore has it that supermarket shares are defensive because people always need to eat and this held true in the days when supermarkets only sold groceries.  But these days supermarkets sell far more than just groceries.  With Tesco taking one pound in every eight spent by British consumers, they will not be able to escape the effects of consumers battenning down.  It is true that food retailers are shifting their offering downmarket in an effort to follow their customers as they trade down in tough times.  However not every food retailer will be able to protect their sales volumes & profits in this way.

Sales of organic produce fell 14% in 2009, indicating that consumers are already trading down, with organic meat sales being hit hard (beef down 25% and chicken down 28%).  Consumers may buy organic & ethically produced food when they feel they can afford it but with the Food Standards Agency stating that there is no scientific evidence that organic food has health benefits, when the squeeze comes consumers will trade back down quickly.

The pain thus far has been felt most by those people who have lost their jobs during the recession.  As interest rates have been cut sharply, the vast majority who are employed have seen their monthly budgets improve as mortgage payments have fallen.  However any post-election tax increases are going to be felt by all 29 mln employed people in the UK (and their families) and this effect will be very broad-based indeed.  The supermarket shopper is going to look to cut back even further and now that the weaker retailers have already gone bust, the one-off boost to the survivors’ sales has already been seen and all are likely to suffer.

The counter-argument to this is that consumers will cut back on eating & drinking out and spend more on their weekly grocery shop instead. This will affect the pub & restaurant sector (which has already de-rated in anticipation and offers better value than supermarket shares).  It remains to be seen what consumers will choose to do when the squeeze is applied by a government seeking to get the budget deficit back under control, but investors should choose to invest where the risks have at least been somewhat discounted and upside is on offer.

However with Tesco, Sainsburys and Morrisons all trading on 13x estimated 2010 earnings, yielding 2.9%, 4.1% and 2.1% respectively, these shares are not a Buy.  If you feel compelled to hold a food retailer then SBRY yields the most and benefits from periodic bouts of takeover speculation.  Much better value is available elsewhere in the market and owners of TSCO, SBRY or MRW should sell out of them as they are too highly rated, still trading within 8% of last year’s highs, and do not offer sufficient upside to compensate for the risk that their sales start to suffer later this year as consumers begin to be squeezed.

The key issue for the markets to contend with in 2010 is the risk that the economy slips back into recession (the so-called “double-dip”).  As the banks have now been largely fixed, should the economy double-dip then it is likely the retailers will be foremost amongst the suffers.   

The retail sector had a strong rally last year as the stockmarket discounted a recovery.  If we use MKS as a proxy for the sector, they rallied from just above 200p in Dec 2008 to finish at the 400p mark, with the annual dividend cut to 15 pence along the way.  The risk now is that the consumer gets squeezed after the May election and consumer spending suffers as a result.  Even if consumer spending does manage to hold up, the sector has already priced in a recovery and there is not enough upside left to reward investors sufficiently to risk owning the shares.  If the sector continues to trade lower then at some point it will make sense to buy back in for the next recovery trade.

A second sector to be very careful of in 2010 is the pub & restaurant sector.  Wet-led tenanted operators such as ETP and PUB are going to continue to struggle whilst their food-led competitors MAB and MARS may fare relatively better.

It is likely that a newly elected government will both cut spending and signal tax rises once the economy is strong enough to bear them. The Government has a massive hole to fill in, net borrowing will end up somewhere around £175 bln in 2009/10 and £180 bln is forecast for 2010/11.  The fact that this is 12.5% of GDP does not tell the whole story as it also represents 39% of pre-credit crunch tax receipts.  The government’s income has fallen by 12% over the past two years but spending has yet to be cut by a single penny.  The emperor has no clothes – Gordon Brown will not countenance spending cuts and doesn’t have any money to “invest in services”, whilst the best David Cameron will be able to do is maintain spending on the NHS and cut spending significantly everywhere else. 

Take a minute to think about the mountain that needs to be climbed in the UK.  Central government total tax income is forecast to be £397 bln in 2009/10.  Adding on £175 bln net borrowing implies total government spending of £572 bln.  In the best year ever, total taxes raised were £451 bln (2007/8).  Its going to be a long, hard slog to get back onto an even keel and it will take years to fill in this particular hole via a combination of spending cuts, tax rises and hopefully renewed economic growth causing the tax base to grow as well.  The Bank of England will wait a very, very long time before risking any rate rises against this backdrop – it is more likely that QE will be resumed (from its current £200 bln) to support the economy/gilts market before any QE exit strategies are implemented.

At the moment the retail sector carries all the risk of being first in the firing line should consumer spending weaken and lead the wider economy into a double-dip recession.  Avoid retailers until the sector offers patient long-term investors a much better risk/reward.

Now that LLOY has wriggled free of the APS and RBS has had no option other than to enter APS, there is uncapped upside in LLOY shares whilst RBS shares still remain effectively capped at 65 pence (due to the terms of the B shares).

Both LLOY and RBS have now sufficiently strengthened their Core Tier 1 capital ratios (to 8.6% and 11.1% respectively) for the market’s focus of attention to turn to recovery possibilities.  RBS have forecast losses for each of the three years 2009, 2010 and 2011 which will eat into their Core Tier 1 capital (and 59 pence NAV) and these losses also imply that RBS will not even start to redeem their outstanding £25.5 bln B shares until 2012 (and then it will probably take RBS at least three years to fully redeem the B shares as they have to be redeemed with fully-taxed profits).  Hence RBS shares are effectively capped at 65 pence until the middle of the next decade because if RBS shares trade above 65 pence then the 7% B-share dividend falls away.  In this case HMT would logically want to convert its B-shares into ords and sell them in the market to realise a profit for the taxpayer.  But £25.5 bln B-shares convert into 51 billion ordinary shares (vs 56.35 bln currently outstanding) and ordinary shareholders will not want to get diluted in this way.  This is a real obstacle in the way of RBS shares progressing above 65 pence anytime over the next 5 years (it is also noteworthy that RBS CEO Stephen Hester’s full £9.6 mln compensation package depends on RBS shares getting to 70 pence).   The only way around the 65 pence cap is for RBS to somehow generate £25.5 bln in Core Tier 1 capital in order to be able to redeem the B shares but launching a rights issue is not the solution as this too will dilute ordinary shareholders (as would a debt-for-equity swap).  RBS may be able to make some money by buying back more of their own debt at a discount but this will only generate a small fraction of the £25.5 bln needed to clear the upside for RBS ordinary shares.  In the meantime RBS are not going bankrupt but RBS shares only become worth buying if they fall back towards their 10 pence low seen in January 2009.

Investors in RBS should switch into LLOY and take up their rights.  There will be plenty of opportunity to bank profits in LLOY and rotate back into RBS over the next 5 years.

As for the other major banks, HSBC are profitable and as a result their Core Tier 1 capital ratio is creeping higher (now 9.0%), but their 80% loan-to-deposit ratio is very conservative.  BARC have recently reported a Core Tier 1 ratio of 8.9% but they seem to be mutating into a global investment bank.  Assuming (for simplicity) the LLOY £13.5 bln rights issue is 1-for-1 at 50 pence, then LLOY post-rights NAV will be approximately 90 pence.  This gives an idea of where LLOY and RBS shares will eventually end up as over the long term bank shares seem to range between 50% and 300% of book value. 

Post Script (7 Dec 2009) : The actual terms of Lloyds’ rights issue were set at 1.34-for-1 at 37 pence.  This results in a Net Asset Value of approximately 73 pence per LLOY share after the rights issue is completed.

It is broadly accepted that we got ourselves into this mess by allowing the banks to lend too much, too cheaply to people who were not really able to pay back the loans they shouldered.  The way out (whilst avoiding a depression caused by deflation & debt-induced personal bankruptcies) involves making existing loans servicable whilst at the same time not allowing people to add to their current debt burdens.  Hence there is a delicate tightrope to be walked along by lowering interest rates for existing borrowers but simultaneously rationing the availability of credit at the same time so that we do not dig ourselves a deeper debt hole than the one we are already in.

Credit can be rationed in two ways, either by restricting the availability of credit (via very strict lending criteria) or by raising the cost of credit (only extending new loans at high spreads over Libor or Base Rates).  Banks are currently not lending freely for many reasons which include households & corporates being unwilling to borrow, the banks wanting to make profits to rebuild their balance sheets and the knowledge that UK banks are going to have to refinance most of the maturing sterling loans which were previously extended by foreign banks (who have now all but ceased lending in the UK), amounting to roughly £80 bln annually over the next few years.

If we are ever to escape consumers having too much debt then the cost of credit needs to be kept high otherwise very low borrowing rates will simply encourage more borrowing which will prove too expensive to service when base rates eventually normalise towards the 5% level (this prospect is at least two years away).

Consumers paying down debt, however slowly, will keep the Austrian School happy as they believe the economy will never recover properly until the high debt burden is worked off.  The Bank of England may well be trying to encourage the banks to move the money they have on deposit at the BoE and lend it into the real economy but it is in no-one’s interest for this to be achieved by the banks lending at very low margins to borrowers of poor credit quality.

The upshot is that any recovery is going to be slow and protracted and banks are going to be making a lot of money during the long, slow recovery as defaults and loan loss provisions will eventually subside but banking margins will remain high as consumers will continue to be charged high rates for borrowing (personal loans, credit cards & mortgages).

The good news for the Government is that UK banks making big profits imply lots of future corporation tax revenues from the banking sector.  However, if banks make hay for long enough then eventually there will be calls for a windfall tax to be imposed on the banks “excessive profits” but that prospect is many years away (although it is hard to envisage a cash-strapped Government resisting the temptation to levy a windfall profits tax - but surely only after they have sold the UK banking shares they currently hold (LLOY, Northern Rock & RBS) at a good profit for the taxpayer).

There has been much speculation about the prospect of Tesco competing strongly with the existing UK banks as it increases its finance footprint and starts to offer loans to its customers.  Tesco already has stores spread nationwide which could serve as a branch network to the millions of customers who already shop there each week. Last year Tesco also bought out RBS’ 50% stake in their Tesco Personal Finance joint venture which means TSCO now has roughly 6 million accounts and deposits of £4.5 bln.  Today Tesco announced a deal with Fortis whereby the latter will provide motor & household insurance underwriting and claims management with Tesco doing the retail pricing and marketing.

However if we follow the money then the prospect of Tesco crushing the existing UK banks by its entry into the banking market seems less fearsome.  The big question is where is Tesco going to get the money from which it would wish to lend out to its customers?  The Bank of England (which will once again resume its proper role as banking regulator if, as currently seems likely, the Conservatives win the next election) will not allow Tesco to fund its lending via the wholesale markets (this is the business model which got Northern Rock into trouble and the BoE will not allow it to happen again anytime soon), so TSCO is going to have to compete with the rest of the banks for its share of retail deposits.  These retail deposits are highly sought after at the moment as every bank (except HSBC with its loan-to-deposit ratio of 90%) is keenly trying to increase its retail deposits so as to shift their loan-to-deposit ratios down towards 100%.  This is the structural problem in the UK banking sector at the moment – there are not enough customer deposits to go around and so most banks will continue to shrink their loan books.

The implication is Tesco are going to struggle to quickly attract tens of billions of pounds sterling in retail deposits and therefore their capacity to extend loans to customers is going to be limited to how fast they can attract deposits.  As Tesco do not intend to run their banking subsidiary at a loss (and have little experience in assessing credit quality), they are going to grow their banking business relatively slowly.  Calm down dear, its only a supermarket trying its hand at banking.  This is nothing new as the Co-op has been in the banking business since 1872 and announced recently that its customer deposits increased 21% in the first half of 2009.

The other way for Tesco to fast-track its way into banking would be to buy Northern Rock off the UK Government.  However NRK holds deposits of £19.5 bln and has a mortgage book of £66.7 bln.  However although the TSCO-to-buy-NRK deal has been rumoured, Tesco would still face the same problem of how to attract sufficient deposits to pay off the billions which NRK still owes to the BoE.  Also NRK’s loan book is said to be of low quality and questions would arise as to whether Tesco is capable of assessing NRK’s outstanding loan book, as in order to get a deal done, a significant chunk of NRK’s mortgage book would remain with the Government.

The existing UK banks needn’t spend too much time worrying about serious competition from Tesco over the next decade.

If LLOY and RBS manage to drag out their “detailed discussions” with HM Treasury over the exact workings of the Asset Protection Scheme then with luck the UK economy will have recovered to a sufficient extent such that LLOY in particular will be able to avoid ever actually formally signing the documentation and entering the scheme.  LLOY stated in their H1 2009 results that they are ” working with HM Treasury to finalise the detailed terms and conditions and operational mechanics of the Group’s intended participation in the Government’s Asset Protection Scheme. The operation of the scheme and the impact on our business (and the consequential impact on our lending and the wider economy) is complex.  The Group expects to conclude these discussions and agree terms and conditions which are in the interests of shareholders”.

In their recent results LLOY were much more optimistic in their outlook than RBS.  LLOY currently have a Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 6.3% and if the economy recovers they could well generate enough operating earnings to cover future impairments (LLOY commented “impairments in the second half of 2009 are expected to be significantly lower than the first half with progressive reductions thereafter”) and thus survive the FSA’s stress test that Core Tier 1 capital may not fall below 4% over the cycle.  Formally entering the APS would effectively cap LLOY shares at 150 pence for the next few years.

RBS reported a Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 6.4% in their H1 2009 results but look unlikely to escape entering into the APS no matter how V-shaped an economic recovery anyone predicts (RBS commented the “APS is key to RBS’s short-term ability to withstand stressed scenarios, though important issues remain to be confirmed”).  Entering the APS would effectively cap RBS shares at 65 pence for the next few years.

From HMT’s viewpoint, not having to take on the liability of insuring 90% of £235 bln of LLOY future write-offs as well as £305.5 bln of RBS future write-offs is clearly a very desirable outcome so its suits HMT as well to allow the current “detailed APS negotiations” to drag on as long as the economy looks to be recovering.

Never formally enacting the APS would remove very large contingent liabilities from the Government’s balance sheet and the APS would have served its purpose by shoring up confidence in the UK banking sector when it was most needed at zero cost to the tax payer.  Such an outcome would be in the best interests of LLOY’s shareholders (with the Government being the largest shareholder) and would also cause a large jump in the LLOY share price which would present a window of opportunity for the Government to be able to sell some shares in LLOY at a profit for the taxpayer.  One way to play this is via a long LLOY/short RBS money-for-money pairs trade as RBS is not strong enough to get by without the APS.  If the banks give back part of their gains since March then LLOY and RBS should broadly track each other; but if LLOY do wriggle free of the APS then they will substantially outperfom RBS.  In the meantime do not expect an early end to the APS negotiations.