Over the past few weeks the Euro has formed a triple bottom at 1.3450 against the Dollar (the lows were on 19 Feb, 25 Feb and 2 Mar 2010).  Triple bottoms are rare in markets because most times a market prints a bottom, bounces off that bottom the first time it is tested but breaks through the support level if it is tested again (hence the old trading adage “Fade the first test but Go With the second test”).

The Euro now appears to have absorbed the selling pressure which has resulted from the problems Greece has been having in refinancing its borrowings.  Whilst the EU has pledged not to abandon Greece it has still not given any firm details on how it plans to offer support to Greece other than to encourage Greece to reduce its budget deficit towards 3% of GDP (as per the euro-zone’s Growth & Stability Pact).  Greece for its part “would like to borrow on the same terms” as other euro-zone members.  However the bond markets will demand a substantial premium to lend money to Greece until it proves it is actually carrying out the deficit-reduction measures it has promised in recent weeks. Yesterday Greece sold a €5 bln 10-year bond with a coupon of 6.25%, yielding roughly 312 bps over Bunds.

It has also become clearer over recent weeks that any support extended to Greece by the EU will not formally involve the ECB printing any money.  Euro-zone member governments have met public opposition to bailing out Greece with taxpayers’ money and the German press in particular has run stories opposing bailing out Greece if it means Greek public sector workers can still retire earlier than their German equivalents or even suggesting Greece sell off some of its uninhabited islands to raise some money.  Greece has in turn demanded the Germans return Greek gold which the Nazis allegedly stole during World War II…

Back to reality.  The receding prospect of the ECB printing money has helped the Euro to find support over recent weeks.  There is a subtle difference between the ECB printing money in order to buy Greek bonds and other euro-zone banks buying Greek bonds yielding circa 6% (with a strong nudge and guarantees from their respective governments) which they then use as collateral to borrow money from the ECB (at 1%).  The latter is simply good banking even if the net effect either way is the ECB finances loaning Greece money.  In the latter case the ECB can correctly claim that the risk lies not with it but with the banks.

Now that the Euro has found support at 1.3450 (until the market proves us wrong), the forex market can switch its attention to giving the Pound Sterling a good kicking in the run up to the May General Election.

The Euro continues to trend lower against the Dollar as the recent turmoil in Greece’s government bond markets has started to spread to Portugal and Spain too.  Events are starting to spiral out of control, evidenced by 10-year Greek bond yields rising from below 6% to more than 7% over the past few weeks (inflicting losses on the buyers of Greece’s €8 bln 6.2% 2015 bond which was issued on 25th Jan 2010).

Eight billion euros is only the first instalment on the €53 bln which Greece needs to raise in 2010 and it is this impending refinancing need which will bring matters to a head sooner rather then later.  Greece is now in the market’s spotlight and is really in trouble because this particular bond market storm is not going to simply blow itself out and go away.

The panic in Greece’s bond market is going to have to get a whole lot worse and this will eventually force the rest of the Euro-zone to act.  The markets don’t believe that the Greek government will be able to impose austerity measures on the Greek public (public demonstrations and strikes have already started).  ECB President Trichet has been quoted as saying ”We expect and we are confident that the Greek government will take all the decisions that will permit them to reach their goal”.  What else can he say?  If he told the truth and said they were stuck like pigs in a poke and the squealing would have to get a whole lot louder before they get bailed out, then Greece’s bond market collapse would intensify and yields would rise even more rapidly.

The endgame is fast approaching and it will not include the IMF lending money.  The bigger and more stable members of the Euro cannot allow Greece to be rescued by the IMF and thereby show the whole world that Euro-land can’t manage its own internal affairs.  Whatever tax-raising promises get made by the Greek government are irrelevant (as only time will tell whether they can actually impose the promised tax rises on the Greek public) as Greece does not have the luxury of time on its side.  

The end of this crisis will be signalled by a large amount of money being loaned to Greece by any or all of the following : Germany, France and the ECB.  Watch out for a classic euro-zone “enhanced credit support” fudge whereby the ECB suddenly decides to embark upon Quantitative Easing which involves the purchase of large quantities of euro-zone members’ government bonds.  The EU itself cannot extend a long-term loan because it also represents non-eurozone members.

Markets are going to become even more disorderly before this panic is over but the bigger picture is that this is a panic in the PIIGS’ government bond markets and, whilst it may impact other markets in the short-term, the resolution of the crisis will provide a buying opportunity across multiple asset classes.  The Euro will keep trending lower against the Dollar (and Sterling to a lesser extent) until the crisis is resolved because the resolution may involve the ECB printing a few hundred billion euros.  The ECB will then have joined the other major central banks in the Race to the Bottom and, as usual, the ECB will once again have proved itself to be the slowest to act.

Given that low Base rates are here to stay for a long while yet, which assets will benefit most from the BoE’s low-rates-for-yonks policy (which is primarily directed at halting the recession and, as a consequence of growth, reducing unemployment)?

Normally government bonds sell-off (higher yields) when the market sniffs an economic recovery but with so much spare capacity in the economy to be worked through, Base rates will remain low until a recovery is well under way and unemployment has turned decisively lower.  In this environment short-dated government bonds should continue to do well, especially for those within 5 years of maturity.  Longer-dated yields may well go higher (especially once the BoE finishes spending its QE money) with the result that we may see a very steep yield curve sustained for quite some time.

Credit spreads on corporate bonds should carry on tightening, although there will come a limit when the absolute level of the coupon offered scares investors – lending money to a BBB-rated corporate at, say, 3% for 5 years will surely make investors think twice.  The margins currently enjoyed by banks will also serve to stop credit spreads from tightening too far as banks enjoy better protection on their loans (so logically the credit spread on corporate bonds ought to be greater than banks’ lending margins).  A steep yield curve also benefits banks greatly too.

Commodities follow a price path all of their own as they offer no yield, so they offer little attraction to income-seeking investors.

Which brings us to equities. Yields in excess of government bonds coupled with low Base rates until a recovery appears mean that equities could quite easily become over-valued against the current backdrop of macro policy.  Companies with big pension schemes may not join the party as the combination of tightening corporate credit spreads and bond yields being held down by QE buying will result in lower AA-bond yields (which are used as the discount rate with which pension scheme liabilities are calculated).  This will temporarily result in bigger pension scheme deficits which the market may well take fright at (again) for those companies affected (the usual suspects are British Airways, British Telecom, etc.), but the effect will subside once the BoE stops propping up the gilts market and long-dated gilts sell off (higher yields).

Once the supply of fresh equity from companies raising money to pay down debt and get their balance sheets into better shape has largely abated, the coast will be clear to bid up the price of equities.  Any type of a recovery (slow & protracted would be ideal) will result in companies growing their top-line sales revenues, whilst all the cost-cutting implemented since the credit crunch hit in summer 2007 means that lots of that top-line growth will translate into higher profits.  And high unemployment rates also mean that workers won’t be getting much of this profit growth.

The obvious risk to this all-out bullish view is that the economy double-dips badly and the hoped-for GDP growth never materialises.  Until that prospect (which looks very unlikely at the moment) seems much likelier to happen, it will not pay to be bearish on equities.  The Bank of England is too worried about spare capacity bearing down hard on inflation to care much, for the time being, about an asset bubble developing in equities.

A recession can be viewed as too little demand for goods & services (nominal GDP). One way for a country to bring itself out of recession is to depreciate its currency (which effectively moves GDP, via exports, to the country in recession from other countries, boosting the former’s GDP). However the problem with the current global recession is that this is not an option as there is too little demand for goods & services across the globe. A country cannot just devalue itself out of a global recession. Japan has just given us an excellent example of what happens when a country is too reliant on exports, as demand has contracted globally, Japanese exports have just fallen off a cliff (down nearly 50%) and Japanese GDP has contracted as a result (when the world finally recovers from this global recession both Germany & Japan are likely to try to grow the size of their domestic economies so as not to fall into this trap again). What is needed is for the global pie of nominal GDP to be expanded.
Welcome to Worldwide Quantitative Easing. If every major economy stimulates its own nominal GDP by convincing their independent central banks to print money and spend it by purchasing government bonds (the governments then spend the borrowed money on goods & services) then the result will be the desired expansion of the global pie of nominal GDP. The side effect is a round of currency devaluations which show up most noticeably against any country which doesn’t engage in QE (the Euro is leading this particular pack and the usually-conservative Swiss recently decided they did not want their currency to appreciate alongside the Euro so they intervened to lower the Swiss Franc against the Euro and embarked upon Quantitative Easing of their own to boost their GDP and underline to the FX market that they meant business). Also, as mentioned in Race to the Bottom (27 March 2009), real assets increase in value (as measured in fiat currencies) - admittedly real estate & equities are currently in bear markets but they won’t last forever, especially at this rate.
The question of whether the world’s central banks are capable creating just enough inflation but not too much can be left for a while.  The central banks will have to err on the side of creating too much inflation in order to be on the safe side – then they can rein inflation back in again by slowly taking the punch bowl away so as not to undermine the recovery.

All this currency printing (Dollars, Sterling, Yen & Swiss Francs) by central banks as they engage in their various forms of quantitative easing is leading to a depreciation of their currencies against real assets. This is being disguised by talk of currencies engaging in competitive devaluations against one another but eventually it will show up in the price of real assets increasing as measured against these fiat currencies. By real assets we are talking about Oil, Real Estate, Gold and Equities (the first three of which God ain’t making any more & equities are a claim on nominal GDP). Government bonds are being propped up by heavy central bank buying and may well remain expensive for years (there is no point in fighting concerted central bank buying of government bonds – John Maynard Keynes pointed out that “markets can stay irrational for longer than speculators can stay solvent”). Don’t read too much into “failed auctions” of Government bonds such as happened this week in Gilts – this is a brave new world and market participants are still feeling their way towards what they should be paying the DMO for 40-year gilts when the BoE is busy buying 5- to 20-year paper. The head of the DMO (whose job it is to sell gilts as expensively as possible) should have kept quiet rather than allow himself to be quoted as saying “Yields at these levels are not all that attractive”. However the general idea to issue longer-dated gilts than the BoE is buying back is surely the correct strategy for the DMO to execute whilst gilt yields are this low, even if the execution is proving a little untidy at times.
As usual the ECB is the slowest of the Western central banks to act – they have yet to commence quantitative easing but the central bankers of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece & Spain (collectively called the PIIGS) must be praying for the ECB to start buying government bonds soon as there are few other buyers of PIIGS bonds at the moment and they have lots to sell. The ECB has a practical problem to overcome if & when it decides to implement quantitative easing, namely which eurozone countries does it choose to favour by buying their government bonds? If the ECB wishes to ease tight credit conditions then it should logically buy the PIIGS’ bonds and squeeze their yields back down towards German levels (the great “convergence trade” would be back on with a vengence), in the process helping to allay market fears about any of the PIIGS leaving the Euro. Once could reasonably expect squealing from any eurozone country whose bonds were not purchased by the ECB. Not a pretty problem for the ECB to overcome whilst other central banks already have the printing presses rolling flat out.

Post-Script (23 April 2009) :  One possible way for the ECB to execute Quantitative Easing would be for the ECB to spend its money by buying equal amounts of each eurozone member countries’ government bonds.  In this way the policy could be sold as being “fair” to all whilst having the desired side-effect of a greater impact on the PIIGS due to the smaller size of their economies relative to Germany, France, et al.